



The failure of the February li Hosokawa- United States, it could be called a cake.
Clinton summit in Washington to pro- Indeed Japan ended the dispute by
duce a trade agreement on U.S. terms bribing Motorola with investment out-
was marked by theatrics on the American lays while affirming the dispute's
side. Deputy Treasury Secretary Roger uniqueness and reiterating the policy of
Altman's banter was typical. He declared, saying no. The Clinton administration,
with the bluntness that Wall Street predictably, performed a war dance, eel-
breeds, that the United States would wait ebrating a victory in a skirmish as if it
"until hell freezes over" for the Japanese had won the war, attributing the
to accept U.S, demands. When Prime Motorola settlement to American
Minister Hosokawa finally said no to resolve and threats, particularly to the
them, the American anger was palpable. president's revival in March of the
U.S, Trade Representative Mickey "Super 301" weapon, which authorizes
Kantor brought to center stage the the administration to highlight coun-
Motorola cellular phones dispute, which tries it determines are trading unfairly
the administration had readied to coin- and, if it chooses, to impose trade sanc-
cide with the summit by speeding up tions in retaliation,
ongoing negotiations. Amenable to
manipulation as "proof" of Japan's perfidy, BREAKINGITSOWNRULES
the dispute was also the one most likely to The Clinton administration, however,
be settled at a low cost, financial and cannot conceal the reality that its policy is
political, by the Hosokawa government to fatally fiawed. The policy makes
save U,S. face: a crumb thrown to the demands that are inconsistent with the
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very principles on which the United mists had forecast that other firms and
States has itself provided leadership in industries would soon jump on the band-
shaping the world trading system over wagon. It was too rewarding a precedent
half a century. As important, the policy not to exploit, and indeed that is exactly
fails to grasp the significant changes that what has happened. Now a complaisant
make both the style and the substance of administration has become the agent for
these demands unacceptable to the new the lobbyists of industries such as autos,
Japan. American policy is thus both auto parts and medical equipment, seek-
unworthy and unworl^ble, ing to impose many more such agree-
The problems with that policy con- ments on Japan.
cern "quantities" and "process." The The proliferation of such import tar-
United States wants managed trade: gets to several sectors would also bring
specifically, it wants the Japanese govern- other countries onto the scene demand-
ment to accept numerical benchmarks ing their own guaranteed share ofthe
and targets for increased imports in Japanese market. The reason is plain
specific sectors. It is also pressing for enough: Japan must be fully aware that
one-way concessions from Japan in areas if it opens up to imports but those
where the United States has judged Japan imports do not come from the United
to be either closed to imports or in viola- States, the pressure from Washington
tion of treaty obligations, acting unilater- will continue. So Japan will have a pow-
ally instead of using impartial procedures erful incentive to divert its imports from
to which Japan would also have recourse, other nations to the United States, even
In both respects, the United States has if the United States pretends that its -
the double disadvantage of having been objective is to open the Japanese econ-
roundly condemned by other nations and omy, not throw contracts the way of
of having not the remotest chance of American firms. Hence, properly fear-
acceptance by Japan. ing trade diversion, the European Union
Benchmarks are only a weasel word has always said that if Japan concedes
for targets (that is, quotas), and these import targets to the United States, the
import targets quickly turn into export EU will be right behind,
protectionism: they work to guarantee for If numbers rather than rules are
American firms a share ofthe foreign accepted as the way to conduct trade,
market just as conventional import pro- the prospect is then certain that Japa-
tectionism gives firms a guaranteed share nese industry would soon be subject to
ofthe domestic market. heavy regulation and compelled to pro-
These targets will multiply because duce the politically agreed market
they are open to manipulation by do- shares. This would be bad enough for
mestic firms that seek assured export Japan, But it would also be a low blow to
markets. When Japan unwisely accepted the rules-based world trading system
the Reagan administration's demand for a that the United States has professed to
numerical benchmark (for the first time uphold at the General Agreement on
in U.S.-Japan trade negotiations), econo- Tariffs and Trade.
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Samurais No More
In consequence, the United States, eralism and want multilateralism; they
traditionally the leader on trade issues to want due process, not the peremptory
the applause of economists, has found judgments ofthe United States (which
itself opposed by economists, whether refiect the self-serving finger-pointing of
Democrats or Republicans. There is also individual U.S. companies),
littie support for America's Super 301- Ironically, but predictably, these are
aided unilateralism. Washington is iso- American ideas. They have spread rapidly
lated when it wants to take the law in its to Japan because, among other reasons,
own hands, especially now that the Japan has large numbers of its young citi-
Uruguay Round has produced a binding zens abroad. Over 40,000 Japanese stu-
settiement procedure. Even if Japan were dents are in the United States today,
guilty as charged, it is unacceptable that learning to put their feet on the table in
the United States should become com- the classroom instead of meekly bowing
plainant, judge and jury. to the sensei (the venerable teacher). With
the dramatic shift in the 1980s in the
THE NEW JAPAN share of Japanese direct foreign invest-
Japan's resistance to U.S. demands was ment away from the poor countries to the
urged worldwide—from Europe in par- rich, prompted in part by the outbreak of
ticular—undoubtedly strengthening protectionism in the EU and in the United
Hosokawa's resolve to say no. But that States, which restricted export access to
resolve comes from within Japan itself, these markets, great numbers of Japanese
refiecting the nuanced yet remarkable women and children also live in the West,
changes that Japan is undergoing. The They are a subversive, modernizing force,
Clinton administration simply does not Increased numbers of Japanese academics
get it: the new Japan is trying to be like can now be found on U.S. campuses,
the old United States just as the new speaking English fiuently and working
United States, with its fiirtation with with Americans at the frontiers of science
industrial policy, embrace of demands for when only a decade ago there were practi-
managed trade, and (as in the president's cally none.
announcement ofthe Saudi purchase of The Japan that was so set on what the
U.S. aircraft) unabashed use of political historian Henry Smith has aptiy called
muscle rather than economic competi- "controlled openness"—drawing carefully
tiveness to succeed in world markets, is on what it liked in other cultures rather
trying to be like the old Japan. than abandoning itself, like the United
Hosokawa, and the large numbers of States, to free cultural infiux and experi-
reform-minded Japanese who voted the mentation—is now beyond such control.
Liberal Democratic Party out of power. The globalization of the Japanese econ-
vidsh an end to old-fashioned regulation, omy and modern communications
Managed trade would turn the clock imposes its own logic on the nation. But
back when they want to push it forward, the Clinton aides in charge of Japan pol-
The reformers also believe in reciprocal icy, mainly Wall Street luminaries and
rights and obligations; they reject unilat- high-profile lawyer-lobbyists with life-
FOREIGN AY¥AIR%-May/JuneJ994 [9 ]
Jagdish Bhagwati
styles that leave little room for reflection an ignorance of its rapid convergence to
and put a premium on going for the the United States today. Washington is
jugular, appear to be ignorant of this his- obsessed with the view that Japan is
toric transformation. These Clinton war- different and special, a predatory
riors think they are fighting the samurai exporter and an exclusionary importer
when they are facing GIs. that must be dealt with as an outlaw.
Indeed, these aides manifested their what Jonathan Rauch has called an "out-
lack of comprehension ofthe new Japan nation," with tough external gaiatsu (for-
with tactical errors in negotiations lead- eign pressure) and targets to restrain
ing up to the summit. The bureaucrats in exports and expand imports.
Japan were assumed to be the problem. Economic analysis hardly supports
The new politicians, keen on reform, such stereotypes. The simpleminded
were assumed to be U.S, allies in seeing assertion coming from the Clinton
the manifest virtue of demands for man- administration that, because Japan's share
aged trade to "open Japan." But the new of manufactured imports in GNP is below
politicians were the ones who had princi- the average ofthe Group of Seven indus-
pled objections to managed trade and trialized nations, Japan "underimports"
also to U.S, unilateralism, and has a closed market requiring special
While the United States was pretend- measures is nonsense. By that token, since
ing that benchmarks were different from Canada's share is substantially higher than
targets, Kantor did not even bother to the United States', the United States
dissimulate when, in the semiconductor should be judged closed relative to
agreement, the U,S, market share fell Canada, Sophisticated econometric stud-
recently below the 20 percent benchmark; ies ofthe question are badly divided; the
instead he came out swinging with both better-crafted of these certainly do not
hands, complaining about the shortfall as support the thesis that Japan imports too
if the benchmark were a target and little, nor do they indicate a special and
demanding corrective action. Moreover, extraordinary effect of informal trade bar-
the president, indulging in Japan-bashing riers that make Japan a fit case for unusual
to promote the North American Free treatment in the world trading system.
Trade Agreement, had already promised Even the imports by Japan of manufac-
revival of Super 301, taking the incentive tured goods, a persistent source of com-
away from the Japanese to settie on U.S. plaint, have grown in the last decade to
terms in order to avoid the provision's over half of its imports. Moreover, the for-
reenactment. The Clinton aides failed to eign share in many of Japan's high-tech
understand that their twin assumptions markets, so dear to Clintonites, is by no
about Japan—that nothing but bluster means static or small. The table on the fol-
can succeed and that bluster cannot fail— lowing page, based on recendy released
were no longer valid, data from the National Science Founda-
In the end, the fiaw in U,S, policy tion, shows that in seven important high-
derives from the exaggeration of Japan's tech markets, the U.S, and Japanese
differences of yesterday as much as from import shares look pretty similar, so much
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SO that if the industries and the countries sistence is shorter-lived than America's
were blacked out, one could well mistake own surplus in the two decades after the
the U.S. chart for Japan's. Second World War. Japan's surplus
The notion of Japan's overwhelming reflects its excess of domestic savings over
difference nonetheless persists because it investment and is generally to be
is reinforced by the egregious fallacy, applauded as a contribution to world net
often repeated by the president and his savings at a time of huge demand for
aides in public, that Japan's huge bilateral investible funds in the developing and the
surplus with the United States is surefire former socialist countries. In the immedi-
proof that Japan's markets are closed, ate short run, Japan can certainly con-
requiring a concentration of one's wrath tribute to its own recovery and indirectly
and energy on Japan. Occasionally, coun- help the United States by undertaking the
terintuitive economic sense will prevail significant fiscal stimulus that Hosokawa
for a moment, but then fallacy, so com- had worked to get. But all macroecono-
pelling to the untrained mind, resurfaces, mists agree that the spillover or "locomo-
Convincing Washington that bilateral tive" effect of Japanese stimulus on U. S.
surpluses are no index ofthe openness of prosperity will be small, making even this
markets is as difficult as convincing a obsession ofthe Clinton administration
peasant that the earth is round when it seem strange. In short, nothing here
appears flat to his naked eye. requires that the United States think that
Nor does Japan's multilateral surplus Japan is "off the curve" in responsible
set it apart as wicked and bizarre. Its per- macroeconomic management: its mis-
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takes are no more gargantuan than those Will the president, no stranger to prin-
of the United States, for example, during cipled and bold changes of course, rise to
the decade of fiscal irresponsibility from the occasion? It will not be easy: the failed
which it has just emerged. trade policy toward Japan is most likely
his own. After all, the North American
COOPERATION, NOT CONFRONTATION Free Trade Agreement and the Uruguay
The cancer at the core ofthe U.S. policy Round were Republican initiatives; he
then is the view that the United States needed one of his own. The Silicon Valley
needs a differential treatment of Japan entrepreneurs were the first to swing to
and a special framework agreement. The him during the campaign; he bought their
justifications for that premise, never view of Japan. He chose advisers that
strong, are particularly implausible today, shared these jaundiced views. He chose a
They must finally be abandoned. U.S. trade representative and a commerce
There is nothing extraordinary even secretary who proudly say that they dis-
about the specific trade disputes with dain economic "theology" and want
Japan. Similar complaints can be made results; so they reflect interests, not prin-
with regard to other nations. The ciples, as they confront Japan,
accounts ofthe delays experienced by The president may have fancied that
Motorola in getting its cellular phone he would have the glory of "opening
system adopted in the Tokyo-Nagoya Japan," as a sort of moclern-day Com-
corridor (one of two in Japan), for exam- modore Perry. That historical parallel will
pie, must be set against the facts that not work. The tragedy is that, by persist-
Motorola was not allowed to set up its ing in the current policy, he may put two
own system at all in France and Ger- great nations on a course that may repeat
many and had to adapt to a different sys- history in less agreeable ways.®
tem there, and that entry into the U.S.
market itself has been impeded by
antidumping harassment. Such examples
can be readily multiplied.
The time has come to admit that
Japan must be allowed to trade by rules
rather than quantities, and that the rules
must include the adjudication of disputes
by impartial procedures available to both
parties. The notion that U.S.-Japan trade
issues are so special that they must be
dealt with bilaterally in a framework that
permits the United States to impose one-
way demands on Japan and to pronounce
unilaterally its own verdicts that Japan
has "failed to live up to its agreements"
must finally be laid to rest.
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